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This article addresses developments during the Survey year in media-
tion and arbitration. It also discusses possible legislative activity in the
newly evolving field referred to as “collaborative law,” and its future ap-
plication in civil disputing beyond family law.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is now a well-established field
of academic study, and permanently engrained in our civil judicial system.
Only fifty or so years ago, there were virtually no ADR course offerings
at any law school in the United States. Today most law schools offer
courses such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. These courses are
often offered as “practice skills” courses in curricula that require students
to complete a certain number of course hours in subjects that are distin-
guished from more academic and traditional course offerings. This new-
found emphasis in American legal education on dispute resolution
reflects an acknowledgement that resolving disputes is something that
lawyers actually do in the daily practice of law. This emphasis is as it
should be. All law students benefit from training and practice in negotia-
tion skills, something they will do every day in their practice. Increas-
ingly, it is fair to suggest to law students that, regardless of the nature of
their practice—even if they will engage in professional pursuits outside
the law—there is a better than even chance that they will attend a media-
tion, if not dozens or even hundreds of mediations, during their careers.
More than a few students will become parties to arbitration agreements
or participate in arbitration proceedings.
So ADR is now well-established in legal academia, but it is not an aca-
demic endeavor. The practice skills orientation of ADR course offerings
is reflected in the annual brevity that characterizes the SMU Annual
Texas Survey, Alternative Dispute Resolution. The dearth of appellate
cases is understandable. Granted, a contract is often the fruit of a negoti-
ation, and things said in a negotiation might someday be alleged to
amount to a business tort, but there will never be an appellate case re-
garding the practice skill of negotiation. Nor will there ever be many ap-
pellate cases or other developments pertaining to mediation; in the prior
Survey there were none.
Although there are a couple of mediation-related cases to highlight this
year, the editors of future issues of the SMU Annual Texas Survey may
wish to consider narrowing this topic to “Arbitration.” Let us begin.
* Will Pryor is a mediator and arbitrator in Dallas. Yale University, B.A., 1978;
Harvard Law School, J.D., 1981. The author wishes to thank the incomparable Dean Ellen
Smith Pryor for her unfailing support and inspiration.
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I. MEDIATION
A. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AN MSA
Understandably, there are very few mediation issues that create con-
troversy. Occasionally there is discussion at CLE programs about
whether every case deserves to be mediated, or whether the “joint ses-
sion,” where all participants are convened to engage in open dialogue, is
a practice that we should discontinue.
One other area of persistent discussion is the importance of the physi-
cal presence at mediation of named parties and “all persons necessary to
the decision to settle” and what “authority to settle” really means.1 In
Texas, a typical judicial mediation referral order includes this instruction:
“Party representatives must have authority to settle and all persons nec-
essary to the decision to settle shall be present.”2
If there is a “gray area” in the world of mediation, this is it. What is
authority? Is even the CEO of a corporate entity fully authorized to enter
into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) and bind the company with
his or her signature if, in fact, formal approval by a Board of Directors
(none of whom are present) will be required? In mediations involving
public entities (e.g., city councils, county commissioners, school boards,
etc.), group participation is never expected, and indeed would probably
create a violation of a state’s Open Meetings Act.3 Public entity media-
tions are almost always conducted with the understanding that any MSA
will be “conditioned upon and subject to” formal approval by the gov-
erning authority in full, public session.4 In mediation of a personal injury
claim, if an insurer sends a representative to a mediation with limited
authority (e.g., authority to a cap of $10,000.00) when an objective analy-
sis of the value of the claim suggests that more authority will probably be
necessary, has the insurance company complied with the court order, or
not? After all, someone with “authority” was present.
Occasionally, judges will get fussy when they perceive that one or both
parties are not taking their mediation order seriously. This appears to
have occurred in In re ProAssurance Insurance Co., where the Dallas
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court judge had overstepped
her authority in issuing a “show cause” order to an insurance company
executive who lived in Alabama.5 The parties in ProAssurance mediated
1. See 7 TEXAS FORMS LEGAL & BUS. § 12:161 (2016); DALLAS COUNTY RULES FOR
MEDIATION, https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/adr/RULES-MEDIATION
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNA9-6VXB].
2. See DALLAS COUNTY RULES FOR MEDIATION, supra note 1.
3. See Will Pryor & Robert M. O’Boyle, Public Policy ADR: Confidentiality in Con-
flict?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2207, 2218 (1993).
4. Suzanne M. McSorley, Take Full Advantage of the Opportunity to Mediate: Pre-
pare, Don’t Just Show Up!, UNDER CONSTRUCTION: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE ABA FO-
RUM ON CONSTRUCTION LAW (A.B.A. Forum on Construction Law, Chicago, IL), Sept.,
2014, at 5, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/under_construction/2014/september_
2014/preparing_for_mediation.html [https://perma.cc/4WDY-HVSW].
5. In re ProAssurance Ins. Co., No. 05-15-01256-CV, 2016 WL 25645 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Jan. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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unsuccessfully, by court order and with an insurance representative pre-
sent, months before trial.6 Months later and after jury selection, without
being ordered to do so, the parties mediated again, with a different insur-
ance representative participating.7 The judge expressed her displeasure
with the situation (“I delayed the entire trial for this”), instructed plain-
tiff’s counsel to file a motion for contempt, placed the insurance repre-
sentative under oath, and questioned her about ProAssurance’s
organizational structure.8 Based on the testimony, the court issued a
“show cause” order to the Chief Claims Officer of ProAssurance, a resi-
dent of Alabama named Darryl Thomas.9 In doing so, the court of ap-
peals held, the trial court judge overstepped her authority: “Because
Thomas is a non-party who lives more than one hundred fifty miles from
Dallas County, Thomas is beyond the trial court’s subpoena power.”10
The trial court judge’s aggressiveness is certainly intriguing. The offen-
sive (to the judge) mediation behavior took place during a voluntary me-
diation, so the insurer unknowingly exposed itself to judicial sanction for
mediating by agreement.11 Of further interest is what the outcome would
have been had poor Mr. Thomas been a resident of Dallas County, Texas,
or if the “show cause” order had not been made personal as to Mr.
Thomas, but instead directed to ProAssurance, the entity. The court of
appeals had an easy out—the obvious lack of personal jurisdiction over
Mr. Thomas.12 How far would the judge have gone in her questioning of
the witness? Would she have attempted to delve into the extent of the
company’s willingness to settle, as if the company owed some sort of duty
to settle?
The outcome of Flores v. Medline Industries, Inc.13 is less disturbing but
posits a circumstance very similar to an ethical puzzler that mediators and
other courts have mulled over for years. Here a brief chronology is im-
portant. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was heard on April
6; apparently unbeknownst to either party, the trial court signed an order
granting the motion for summary judgment on that date and filed it with
the district clerk on April 11. Still oblivious to the court’s ruling, the par-
ties proceeded to mediation on April 16, when they entered into an MSA
that recited, “The parties acknowledge that bona fide disputes and con-
troversies exist between them.”14 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
determined that the record revealed fact issues as to mutual or unilateral
mistake, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further
6. Id. at *1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *1.
12. Id. at *2.
13. No. 13-14-00436-CV, 2015 WL 9257070 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 17, 2015,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
14. Id. at *1.
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proceedings.15
Is there anything wrong with this outcome? But for the recitation of
the “acknowledgement” by the parties, a detail often not included in
MSAs, would it be as apparent that counsel did not know what the trial
court had done? Why is the trial court’s ruling deemed conclusive when
motions for reconsideration or a new trial—and obviously the route of an
appeal—were available to one of the parties? On the other hand, the
outcome seems one of common sense and fairness. Had the parties
known of the court’s ruling, the mediation would presumably not have
occurred.
II. ARBITRATION
There have been survey years when one or more appellate court deci-
sions dramatically shifted the arbitration landscape. In its 2008 decision in
Perry Homes v. Cull, the Texas Supreme Court found, for the first time in
the supreme court’s history, substantial invocation of the judicial process
and, consequently, a waiver of an arbitration clause.16 In the same year,
the U.S. Supreme Court shook the arbitration world in Hall Street Associ-
ates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. with the pronouncement that the grounds for
vacatur of arbitration awards listed in the Federal Arbitration Act were
exclusive, and that long-existing common law grounds for vacatur, such as
“manifest disregard of the law,” would no longer be recognized.17 In its
2012 decision in Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, the Texas Supreme Court
seemed to resist the move in Hall Street, distinguishing arbitration clauses
that invoked the Texas Arbitration Act when the parties had expressly
reserved common law grounds for judicial review.18
So there are years of note, but this Survey year was not one of them.
Few decisions qualified as important to the development of arbitration
law and the practice of arbitration. Instead, this author made an effort to
identify cases that explained an existing principle in a novel manner, or
that addressed a fairly straightforward issue but in an interesting context.
The general issue presented by Hall Street and Nafta Traders—the va-
lidity of common law grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards—has
been a central factor for decades in the growth and wide acceptance of
arbitration.19 Participants in arbitrations for almost a century took advan-
tage of the traditional benefits of arbitration (efficiency, cost savings, and
so forth), but always with a security blanket.20 The security blanket was
that if something went askew, if something about the process in general
15. Id. at *8.
16. Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 592 (Tex. 2008).
17. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
18. Nafta Traders Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 99 (Tex. 2011).
19. See Hall Street, 52 U.S. at 581; Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 99.
20. The Benefits of Arbitration in Texas, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SEC-
TION, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Jury_
Information&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=27796 [https://perma.cc/
2VNT-C6QH].
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or the award in particular went awry, parties always had the opportunity
to have a “court of competent jurisdiction” set the award aside.21 “Mani-
fest disregard of the law” and other judicially created protections against
the “arbitrariness” of the arbitration outcome were like a pressure valve
to be released in the event of an emergency.22
So when the Hall Street decision was announced, it shook the arbitra-
tion world. It was as if the U.S. Supreme Court was reaching to fix some-
thing that wasn’t broken, achieving an outcome that was as undesirable as
it was unexpected. Suddenly, arbitration was less friendly and, in fact,
threatening. Should a panel or even a single arbitrator hand down an
award that was clearly beyond what the law would have allowed in the
judicial system, the award would be binding, absent a finding of a very
narrow list of grounds for vacatur.23
This development, combined with a decade or two of judicial approval
of consumer and employment arbitration clauses, no matter how “adhe-
sive,” left some to wonder what kind of justice system we had created,
where arbitration could be imposed on the unknowing and unwilling and,
if the arbitrator ignored the law, so be it.24
Nafta Traders provided some comfort to those distressed by Hall
Street.25 Just specify in your arbitration agreement that the Texas Arbitra-
tion Act and not the Federal Arbitration Act governs the agreement, and
express the desire of the parties to preserve the right to ask a court for
relief from an improper award, and your security blanket was safe from
harm.26
The outlier in this Survey year, the case that was significant in altering
the arbitration landscape, was the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in
Hoskins v. Hoskins.27 Hoskins is a Texas adoption of Hall Street, where
review of arbitration awards, even arbitrations expressly governed by the
Texas Arbitration Act, are strictly limited to the enumerated grounds for
vacatur in the Texas statute.28 The supreme court distinguished the out-
come of Nafta Traders: “In that case, the parties’ arbitration agreement
stated that the ‘arbitrator does not have authority (i) to render a decision
which contains a reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a
21. See, e.g., Confirmation, Modification, or Vacation of Arbitration Award, Texas
Trial Handbook § 5:30 (3d. ed.).
22. Jason P. Steed, Appealing Arbitration Awards and the Circuit Split over “Manifest




23. See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 590–91.
24. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the
Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://per
ma.cc/G3MG-QC7H].
25. See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
26. Id. at 99.
27. 497 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. 2016).
28. Id. at 495.
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cause of action or remedy not expressly provided for under existing state
or federal law.’”29 The lesson from Hoskins appears to be that, while pre-
serving judicial review for mistakes in law is still possible, the arbitration
contract must state that agreement and also must state that the Texas
Arbitration Act governs the proceedings.30
Within a month of the publication of the Hoskins decision, the Dallas
Court of Appeals deemed it outcome determinative in Elite Framing v.
BBL Builders, L.P.31 The court of appeals reversed a trial court’s vacatur
of an arbitration award because the common law ground of “gross mis-
take” was no longer available.32 In the post-Hall Street and post-Hoskins
world, resourceful lawyers seem to have adopted a new argument: if they
originally had argued that a “manifest disregard of the law” had infected
an award, what they really had meant was that arbitrators had “exceeded
their powers,” a statutory ground for vacatur.33 This argument does not
work often, and in Elite Framing, when the appellant contended that the
damages calculation of the arbitrator amounted to a disregard of the con-
tract between the parties, the court of appeals disagreed.34 The issue “is
not whether the arbitrator decided an issue . . . correctly, but instead,
whether the [arbitrator] has the authority to decide the issue at all.”35
Unlike the world of mediation, judicial interaction with arbitration
agreements and proceedings is routine. The most common intersection
comes at two distinct points—the “front-end” of arbitration, and the
“back-end.”36 The back-end decisions are those like Hoskins and Elite
Framing, when a court is asked to either confirm or set aside an arbitra-
tion award.37 The front-end decisions are those that address issues such as
arbitrability, the scope of the agreement, whether the agreement is valid
or whether it is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable, or whether
certain parties can be bound by an agreement and obligated to arbitrate
in the face of their desires otherwise.38
Included in these front-end decisions are cases where a party who was
not a party to the arbitration agreement or who never signed the agree-
ment may still be bound by it, or may elect to be bound by it.39 We have
three of those cases to examine.
29. Id. at 494 (quoting Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 88).
30. Id. at 496.
31. No. 05-15-01430-CV, 2016 WL 3346041 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2016, pet.
filed) (mem. op.).
32. Id. at *2.
33. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Mills & Thomas J. Brewer, ‘Exceeded Powers’: Exploring
Recent Trends in Cases Challenging Tribunal Authority, AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC. (Mar.
20, 2014), https://www.aaau.org/media/20038/supplemental%20materials.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M7QL-6EF7].
34. Elite Framing, 2016 WL 3346041 at *3.
35. Id.
36. Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 64 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2011).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 6, 11.
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In Hays v. HCA Holdings, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas found, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed, that applying “direct benefits estoppel” to the plaintiff’s
tortious interference claim was proper.40 Hays was an epileptic cardiolo-
gist with claims for wrongful termination of his at-will employment and
tortious interference.41 Hays did not want to arbitrate his claims, but the
Fifth Circuit applied “direct benefits estoppel[,]” which occurs “when the
claim depends on the contract’s existence and would be ‘unable to “stand
independently” without the contract.’”42 Here, Hays pled his tortious in-
terference claim as an alternative theory, leaving HCA’s liability depen-
dent on resolution of Hays’s contract claim.43 The Fifth Circuit also
approved the district court’s application of intertwined claims estoppel,
which occurs when a “nonsignatory defendant has a ‘close relationship’
with one of the signatories and the claims are ‘intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.’”44 Noting that the
Texas Supreme Court had not recognized “intertwined claims estoppel,”
the Fifth Circuit had to make “an Erie guess and determine as best we
can what the Supreme Court of Texas would decide.”45 In applying the
theory to Hays’s contentions against several entities that were “virtually
indistinguishable[,]” Hays was compelled to arbitrate all of his claims.46
Direct benefits estoppel was also invoked in a different context, to re-
quire the surviving family members of deceased former residents of an
assisted living center in San Antonio to arbitrate their claims. In Specialty
Select Care Center of San Antonio, L.L.C. v. Owen,47 the family members
had signed admission agreements of behalf of their family members
about to become residents of the facility. In doing so, the family members
“directly benefited” from the agreements, and so were obligated to arbi-
trate their subsequent claims.48
There are two issues worthy of note in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Nelson v. Watch House International,
L.L.C.49 The first is the ease with which the Fifth Circuit determined that
Nelson, employed by Watch House, was subject to an arbitration agree-
ment in an electronic version of the employment manual which Nelson
never signed, even though the Plan definition of “employee” was “the
individual whose signature is affixed hereto.”50 The opinion mentions this
40. Hays v. HCA Holdings, Inc., 838 F.3d 605, 613 (5th Cir. 2016).
41. Id. at 608.
42. Id. at 609 (citing G.T. Leach Builders v. Sapphire V.P., L.P, 458 S.W.3d 502, 528
(Tex. 2015)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 610 (citing In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 193–94 (Tex.
2007)).
45. Id. at 611.
46. Id. at 612–13.
47. 499 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
48. Id. at 42.
49. 815 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2016).
50. Id. at 192.
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fact but then glosses over it.51 This writer thought the issue deserved
more attention. But, the substance of the opinion has to do with whether
the arbitration agreement was “illusory,” and consequently unenforce-
able.52 “Illusory” in this context means that one party (the employer) has
the “unrestrained unilateral authority to terminate” the arbitration agree-
ment.53 When an arbitration agreement is “illusory,” it is
unenforceable.54
To appreciate the Watch House decision, it might be helpful to review a
bit of the development of the “illusory” defense to arbitration agree-
ments. In In re Halliburton, the Texas Supreme Court relied on two pro-
visions in an arbitration agreement to determine that it was not illusory:
no amendment [to the arbitration agreement] shall apply to a Dis-
pute of which . . . [employer] had actual notice on the date of amend-
ment . . . and that termination shall not be effective until 10 days
after reasonable notice of termination is given to Employees or as to
Disputes which arose prior to the date of termination.55
This is often referred to as a “savings” clause.56 In Lizalde v. Vista Qual-
ity Markets, the Fifth Circuit in 2014 stated a three-pronged, rather than
two-pronged test for determining whether an agreement is illusory: the
agreement is not illusory so long as the power to terminate “(1) extends
only to prospective claims, (2) applies equally to both the employer’s and
employee’s claims, and (3) so long as advance notice to the employee is
required before termination is effective.”57 Applying the Lizalde test to
the Watch House arbitration agreement, the Fifth Circuit held that
“Watch House’s retention of this unilateral power to terminate the Plan
without advance notice render[ed] the Plan illusory[.]”58
In the last of our “front-end” judicial encounters with arbitration
agreements, we find the rare determination that a clause was unconscion-
able, and consequently unenforceable.59 In AOF Services, LLC v. Santor-
sola, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that an eighty/twenty
arbitration fee-splitting arrangement was substantively unconscionable.60
Unlike prior decisions involving fee-splitting arrangements, here the
Claimant’s exposure for fees was not capped.61 The claimant’s affidavit
that he could not reasonably afford the costs of arbitration if they ex-
ceeded $5,000.00, and his arbitration-experienced lawyer’s affidavit stat-
51. Id. at 193.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 196.
55. Id. at 193 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566,
569–70 (Tex. 2002)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 194 (quoting Lizalde v. Vista Quality Mkts., 746 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir.
2014)).
58. Id. at 196.
59. See Pryor, supra note 36, at 9.
60. AOF Servs., LLC v. Santorsola, No. 13-14-00641-CV, 2016 WL 1165829 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
61. Id. at *3.
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ing that based on his experience, arbitration for his client would not be
economically feasible, satisfied the claimant’s burden of demonstrating
prohibitive expense and “of showing the likelihood of incurring such
costs.”62
Scrutiny was applied to published arbitration awards in two cases re-
viewed here.63 The first, Wright vs. Menta, is replete with expressions of
concern by the Dallas Court of Appeals over the arbitration proceedings
and the conduct of the arbitrator in reviewing the evidence submitted
regarding attorneys’ fees.64 The evidence of attorneys’ fees was supported
in the record by affidavits from the attorneys; the detailed billing records
were submitted for in camera inspection.65 The Respondent objected and
argued an entitlement to review the billing records, which objection drew
a half-hearted denial by the court of appeals: “[A]ny alleged misconduct
did not rise to the level of depriving the Wrights of a fair hearing.”66
Reading between the lines, the court of appeals implies that there were
better ways for the arbitrator to have handled this issue.67 Also at issue
was whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding attorneys’
fees for claims outside of his jurisdiction, the issue of inventorship of pat-
ents having been expressly reserved by a federal court.68 Because the ar-
bitrator specifically stated in the award that he did not address the
invention of the patents, “[w]e presume the arbitrator’s award of attor-
neys’ fees was for claims properly submitted to him to decide, and noth-
ing in the record rebuts that presumption.”69 The amended final
arbitration award was affirmed.70
Finally, we turn to Eaton Commercial, L.P. v. Paradigm Hotel SA
Riverwalk, LP.71 Although vagueness of an arbitration award is not con-
sidered a basis for vacatur,72 vagueness or ambiguity can result in the
proceedings being remanded to the arbitrator for clarification.73 It is not
necessary to delve into the complicated arithmetic performed by the arbi-
trator in calculating the damage award; needless to say, it involved an
“adjustment” and a “change order”: “[T]he award is unclear regarding
62. Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)).
63. See Eaton Commercial, L.P. v. Paradigm Hotel SA Riverwalk, LP, No. 04-15-
00705-CV, 2016 WL 5795195 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 5, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Wright v. Menta, No. 05-15-00272-CV, 2016 WL 3141578, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 6,
2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
64. Wright, 2016 WL 3141578, at *2. Disclosure: this author was the arbitrator in this
case.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *4.
67. See id. at *3–6.
68. Id. at *5.
69. Id. at *6.
70. Id. at *7.
71. No. 04-15-00705-CV, 2016 WL 5795195 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 5, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
72. See Wright, 2016 WL 3141578, at *5 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 171.088 (West 2011)) (“[W]e have not found any authority stating that vagueness is a
basis upon which to vacate an arbitration award . . . .”).
73. Eaton Commercial, 2016 WL 5795195, at *2.
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the total amount Eaton was owed after the $769,553.33 adjustment.”74
The matter was remanded to the trial court for further remand to the
arbitrator.75
III. COLLABORATIVE LAW
The SMU Annual Texas Survey has twice before given attention to an
ADR method known as collaborative dispute resolution, more often re-
ferred to as Collaborative Law.76 The relatively recent (1990) brainchild
of a small group of lawyers in Minnesota, Collaborative Law has taken
root in Texas somewhat exclusively in the arena of marriage dissolution,
validated by amendment to the Texas Family Code in 2011.77 As previ-
ously noted,
[C]ollaborative law is a procedure in which the parties and their
counsel agree in writing to use their best efforts and make a good
faith attempt to resolve their dissolution of marriage dispute on an
agreed basis without resorting to judicial intervention. Perhaps the
most distinctive feature of the collaborative process is the require-
ment that all counsel be parties to the agreement and that the agree-
ment requires “withdrawal of all counsel involved in the
collaborative law procedure if the collaborative law procedure does
not result in settlement of the dispute.”78
The looming issue is whether collaborative law will ever jump the fence
and become a practice in the world of general, civil disputing. In 2011,
this author suggested that there was a “growing interest” in such an ex-
pansion.79 Now, six years later, it is fair to say that while little actual ex-
pansion into general, civil disputing has occurred,80 there is still a growing
interest! In July 2009, the Uniform Law Commission (the promulgating
body of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Arbitration Act,
and roughly 250 other uniform laws that are put forward for considera-
tion by state legislatures), approved a Uniform Collaborative Law Act.81
A Texas Uniform Collaborative Law Act will be before the Texas legisla-
ture in 2017.82
Whether the time is right for the advancement of collaborative law, this
author believes that the evolution is inevitable. Litigation and jury trials
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id. at *4.
76. See Pryor, supra note 36, at 15; Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 SMU
L. REV. 519, 528 (2008).
77. For an excellent history of the invention of collaborative law and its transportation
to Texas, see Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., The Development of Collaborative Law, ALTERNA-
TIVE RESOLUTIONS, Summer/Fall 2007, at 22.
78. Pryor, supra note 36, at 15 (reciting from TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(c)(4)).
79. Id.
80. See Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr. & Sherrie R. Abney, Civil Collaborative Law is on
the Move: But, it Needs Your Help, ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Spring 2012, at 5–8.
81. Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., The Proposed Texas Uniform Collaborative Law Act:
An Executive Summary, ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Summer 2016, at 30–42.
82. Id. at 35.
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have their virtues, but they remain the most grossly inefficient mecha-
nisms for resolving disputes ever created. Just as mediation endured years
of controversy and slow growth, collaborative law will eventually gain a
foothold in business-to-business dispute resolution before it becomes
even more widespread. It is not hard to foresee, in ten to twenty years,
the development of boutique firms that will specialize in collaborative
representation in business disputes. Some view this development as un-
likely.83 This view usually begins with the argument that the disqualifica-
tion of counsel feature in the collaborative law “participation agreement”
will add to the delay and expense of disputing for businesses who have
ongoing relationships with their lawyers and law firms.84 But a process
that eliminates the incentive for counsel to engage in a strategy that per-
petuates disputing and that only rewards resolution is a process that will
eventually be too attractive to ignore for in-house counsel and corporate
executives overwhelmed by their litigation costs and expenses. Litigation
is too expensive, time consuming, distracting, inefficient, and unpredict-
able. The legal profession may have to be dragged along into the future,
but a society that needed and wanted alternatives, and turned to arbitra-
tion and then mediation, will continue to explore new alternatives.
83. See Anna Sapountsis, Challenges of Collaborative Practice and the Commercial
Context, COLLABORATIVE LAW at 1 (2013).
84. See id. at 5–7.
